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1  BACKGROUND 
 
 Argonne National Laboratory has been asked to review the least-cost expansion plan 
(LCEP) of the Jamaica Public Service Company, Ltd. (JPSCo). The material that has been 
initially provided to Argonne included: 
 
• An electronic copy of the data and results from JPSCo’s running the WASP electric 
system expansion planning model,  
 
• Approximately 20 pages of a document JPSCo Generation Expansion Plan, marked 
“DRAFT 002”, date unknown, and 
 
• The report JPSCo Least Cost Generation Expansion Plans, (1999-2009), January 
1999 
 
It was noticed that the 20 pages from the “DRAFT 002” document were different from 
the January 1999 report.  An explanation was provided to Argonne that the excerpt was from an 
earlier draft and that the review should focus on the January 1999 report. Further, the electronic 
copy of the WASP case did not correspond to either the January 1999 report or to the 20-page 
excerpt. Again, the reason for these discrepancies was that the WASP case provided to Argonne 
was an earlier case and not the final one that was presented in the report.  
 
Based on the review of the available material, Argonne experts have prepared and 
submitted to the National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ) a preliminary draft report 
containing the initial findings, comments, questions and observations. As many of the comments 
and questions raised in the preliminary review needed to be discussed with the appropriate staff 
of JPSCo and other Jamaican experts, a 3-day mission to Jamaica was carried out by one 
Argonne expert (V. Koritarov) in the period July 20-23, 1999.  
 
Besides JPSCo experts, the discussions and the review of the LCEP during the mission 
included several experts from NIBJ, Ministry of Energy, and the Petroleum Corporation of 
Jamaica. Mr. Koritarov also worked with the JPSCo technical staff to reconstruct the WASP base 
case that was used as a basis for the January 1999 report. The first step was to verify that the 
results obtained after the resimulation of this case were identical to those presented in the 
January 1999 report. Then, in the next step, the Argonne expert and JPSCo team reviewed this 
case in detail and performed certain modifications and improvements of data where necessary. 
These modifications and data adjustments resulted in a new base case that served as a basis for 
further review and for the sensitivity analyses. Several sensitivity analyses were performed 
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together with JPSCo experts and the results were discussed with the JPSCo management and 
other Jamaican experts at the end of the mission. Additional sensitivity analyses, as well as the 
cases for high and low load forecasts, were conducted by Mr. Koritarov after returning from 
Jamaica. The main findings of the review and issues that have been discussed with the Jamaican 
team can be summarized as follows. 
 
 
2  MAIN FINDINGS AND COMMENTS 
 
 
2.1 DEMAND FORECAST 
 
• JPSCo has developed load forecasts for three growth scenarios: base, low, and high. The 
average annual load growth over the period 1998-2017 was projected at 6.15% for the base 
case, at 3.46% for the low-growth scenario, and at 8.37% for the high-growth scenario. These 
projections were developed using an econometric model that takes into account several 
variables such as projections of GDP, disposable income per capita, employment, exchange 
rate, and the growth of urban population. The obtained results seem to be reasonable and the 
three growth projections cover a relatively wide range of possible future demand growth. 
 
• While the use of an econometric model and a regression analysis of electricity demand with 
explanatory variables (as referenced on p 11 of the January 1999 document) is a generally 
accepted load forecasting technique, it does not account for significant changes in the 
structure of demand.  The statement on the bottom of p 4 of the January 1999 document 
illustrates this point when commenting on a step change in demand due to the addition of the 
Caribbean Cement Co. facility.  A preferred methodology for load forecasting is one that 
combines techniques to address significant structural changes in demand (such as major new 
facilities, changes in consumer behavior, etc.) with conventional techniques of analyzing 
historical trends in demand.  
 
• The input system load factor (p 4 of the January 1999 report) is projected to remain at 72% 
over the time horizon (71% in the WASP case data). This is a rather high system load factor 
that may decrease with the expansion of the system in the future, especially if there are no 
active demand side management programs in place. The January 1999 report (p 12) mentions 
demand side management but only in the context of pilot programs. At present, it is not clear 
if these DSM programs will be fully implemented and what their contribution will be to the 
reduction of system loads and if they will be sufficient to maintain the high system load 
factor. 
 
• Although three demand forecasts (base, high, and low) are shown in the report (Table 1, p 4 
of the January 1999 report), the results presented in the report are related only to the base 
load forecast, and no results are shown for the analyses performed using the high and low 
load forecasts. Argonne suggests that the results obtained for other load forecasts, as well as 
for the sensitivity studies be presented, thus providing a comprehensive report covering all 
aspects of the planning process.  
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2.2 FUEL PRICE FORECAST 
 
• Except for a short discussion on p 21, the January 1999 document does not provide much 
information on the projections of fuel prices that were used in the LCEP analysis. Instead,  
the assumed projections of fuel prices were obtained directly from the WASP case, by 
reviewing the escalation factors for fuel prices that were used in the analysis. It was noticed 
that the escalation factors for diesel oil were much higher than those used for the heavy fuel 
oil. JPSCo experts recognized this as an error which was probably caused by using escalation 
factors for diesel oil that included local taxes and duties. This error was corrected for the new 
base case. 
 
• The projections of fuel prices over the study period were reviewed in detail and compared to 
the latest projections available in the publication “International Energy Outlook 1999 with 
Projections to 2020,” published by the Energy Information Administration of the United 
States Department of Energy [DOE/EIA-0484(99)], April 1999. The EIA publication 
presents their own projections of energy prices (for three scenarios: reference case, high price 
case, and low price case), as well as forecasts developed by a number of U.S. and 
international institutions and organizations dealing with energy. In addition, for the purpose 
of LCEP review, other sources that provide long-term projections of fuel prices have been 
consulted (e.g., The World Bank, British Petrol, etc.). The review concluded that the 
projections of fuel prices that were used for the LCEP analysis were closely following the 
general trends of projections obtained from the above sources. Based on the review of 
different projections, the expected market trends for major fuels can be summarized as 
follows. Oil prices are expected to quickly rebound from the low level experienced in 1998 to 
about 20 U.S.$/bbl and then to remain constant or have a slight positive escalation thereafter. 
Coal prices are expected to continue to decline with a negative escalation rate of about 1.5% 
per year. Natural gas prices are expected to have a small positive escalation rate of 0.8% per 
year, however natural gas is not currently a viable fuel supply option in Jamaica. For 
comparison, the projections of fuel prices that were used in the analysis of the new base case 
are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
• The LCEP authors have considered possibilities for fuel diversification (p 10 of the January 
1999 report). This is a legitimate consideration, especially in the case of high dependency on 
certain types of fuel for a country’s energy needs, such as Jamaica. 
 
 
2.3 EXISTING SYSTEM DATA 
 
• The existing hydro plants and most candidates are all shown as run-of-the-river with no 
storage capability whatsoever. If there were only a few hours of storage available at some of 
the hydro sites, the hydro representation in the WASP model would change considerably. 
This issue has been discussed with JPSCo experts who confirmed that all existing hydro 
power plants are purely run-of-the-river type without any regulating capability. 
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• In the FIXSYS module of WASP, the forced outage rates for generating units were mostly 
specified as 6% and for some units as 5%.  Forced outage rates of only 5-6% for thermal 
plants are lower than expected and imply an active preventive maintenance program. The 
existence of such a maintenance program has been confirmed in discussions with JPSCo 
experts, so that no changes in the specification of forced outage rates for existing units were 
performed for the new base case analysis. 
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Figure 1:  Projections of Fuel Prices 
 
 
• The modeling of independent power producers (IPPs) was also reviewed. It was concluded 
that generating units owned and operated by private companies (JPPC, JEP, etc.) were 
modeled properly and accurately. 
 
 
2.4 EXPANSION OPTIONS 
 
• A rule of thumb from a system reliability perspective is that no generating unit should have a 
capacity greater than 10% of the peak load. The 120 MW units proposed for addition to the 
system are more than 20% of the peak in 2002. They remain more than 10% of the peak load 
beyond the year 2007. (The issue is addressed on p. 16 of the January 1999 report). 
Apparently, the decreased system reliability associated with the larger unit size is overcome 
by the factors listed on p. 16.  However, the assumed forced outage rate of only 3% for a 120 
MW coal-fired generating unit is very low and is a major factor in this reliability-cost 
tradeoff associated with unit size.  This low forced outage rate may make the 120 MW unit 
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(comprising more than 20% of the system peak load) unrealistically attractive. This issue has 
been extensively discussed with the JPSCo experts who agreed to increase the forced outage 
rate for coal-fired units to 8% for the new base case analysis. 
 
• Forced outage rates for other candidate plants (WASP data) were also specified rather low (in 
the range from 3% to 5%). For the new base case analysis, the forced outage rates of 
candidate units were increased (except for the gas turbine) and specified as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1:  Forced Outage Rates of Candidate Units 
 
 
Candidate Technology 
 
Forced Outage Rate 
(%) 
Oil-fired steam (63 MW) 6 
Coal-fired steam (80 MW) 8 
Coal-fired steam (120 MW) 8 
Medium-speed diesel (20 MW) 5 
Low-speed diesel (30 MW) 5 
Gas (combustion) turbine (33 MW) 5 
Combined-cycle (102 MW) 7 
 
 
• The fuel price for coal-fired candidates was specified as U.S.$47.89 per ton of coal in the 
base year (1997) of the WASP case, which was deemed rather high. Currently, coal for 
electric power utilities on the international market is widely available at prices lower than 
U.S.$40 per ton. For the new base case analysis, the price of coal was reduced to U.S.$42 per 
ton (in the base year 1997), which also takes into account the transportation costs to Jamaica. 
The price of coal further decreases over the study period because of the negative escalation 
factors applied to the coal fuel. The price level in 2002 is about U.S.$40 per ton of coal. 
 
• The capital investment costs for candidate units have also been carefully reviewed. The net 
overnight costs for the gas (combustion) turbines and combined cycle units were decreased, 
while the capital costs for the 120 MW coal-fired unit were increased by 15% to account for 
environmental control equipment. Also, interest during construction costs were added to the 
capital investment costs, as required by the WASP methodology. The revised net overnight 
costs for candidate units (in U.S. dollars as of 1997) are presented in Table 2. 
 
• A new set of screening curves for candidate technologies was constructed to perform a 
preliminary assessment of the effects of changes introduced into the new base case on the 
expansion candidates.  By plotting the levelized cost of electricity production of candidate 
technologies as a function of their annual utilization (or capacity factor of generating units), 
the screening curves provide an indication of their competitiveness for system expansion. Of 
course, the actual optimization of the system development with the WASP model is much 
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more complex and takes into account many different aspects not addressed by the relatively 
simplistic screening curve approach. Nevertheless, the screening curve analysis is very 
useful, especially in the preparation phase for the systems planning exercise, and helps detect 
certain data inconsistencies and illustrate relative merits of candidate technologies. Figure 2 
shows screening curves constructed for the expansion candidates in the new base case 
analysis. 
 
 
Table 2:  Capital Costs of Candidate Units 
 
 
Candidate Technology 
 
Net Overnight Cost 
(U.S.$/kW) 
Oil-fired steam (63 MW) 1,200 
Coal-fired steam (80 MW) 1,700 
Coal-fired steam (120 MW) 1,495 
Medium-speed diesel (20 MW) 1,150 
Low-speed diesel (30 MW) 1,600 
Gas (combustion) turbine (33 MW) 600 
Combined-cycle (102 MW) 750 
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Figure 2:  Screening Curves for Candidate Technologies 
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2.5 PLANNING VARIABLES 
 
• The January 1999 report states that economic indicators and planning variables were 
obtained from the Planning Institute of Jamaica. The real discount rate used in the WASP 
analysis for capital investment and operating costs was 12%, which seems reasonable for a 
developing country such as Jamaica. The report does not provide information if sensitivity 
studies on lower and higher values of discount rate have been performed. These sensitivity 
studies should be performed, at least, for discount rates of 8, 10, and 14%. 
 
• The value of energy-not-served (ENS) of 1.5 U.S. dollar/kWh used in the WASP analysis is 
within the usual range from 0.5 to 1.5 $/kWh that is commonly used for system planning 
purposes. However, sensitivity studies should be performed for other values of ENS, 
especially because the selected ENS value for the baseline analysis is at the high end of the 
range. 
 
 
2.6 CONSTRAINTS 
 
• The maximum value of Loss-of-load probability (LOLP) reliability parameter of 0.55% (2 
days per year) used in the WASP analysis seems to be reasonable for the existing and 
planned plant mix in the electric power system of Jamaica. 
  
• The maximum reserve margin in the WASP case was specified as 90% above the peak load. 
For the new base case analysis the maximum reserve margin was reduced to 60%. This was 
considered sufficient, on one hand, to include all possible system configurations that could 
satisfy the demand with the desired reliability and, on the other hand, to avoid examining a 
large number of configurations with significant excess capacity. 
 
 
2.7 OPTIMIZATION RESULTS 
 
• The results obtained for the new base case and sensitivity studies are presented in Table 3. 
The total cost of the least-cost expansion plan obtained for the base case analysis, which 
represents a present worth (expressed in U.S. dollars as of 1997) of all system investment and 
operating costs over the study period 1997-2017, amounted to U.S.$ 1.952 billion. For the 
purpose of sensitivity analysis, the optimization of system development was also performed 
for a number of different scenarios. The costs of these alternative scenarios are also presented 
in Table 3, as well as the cost difference of each alternative scenario compared to the base 
case analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Optimization Results for the New Base Case and Sensitivity Studies 
 
   PW(1997) PW(1997)   
   Cost of Plan Difference  TOTAL 
  Expansion Scenario (US$ 000) (US$ 000) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (MW) 
      
  Base Case (Coal Avail. 2002) 1951975 0 - - GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 CC 102 561 
  No Coal until 2003 1952432 457 - - GT 33 GT 33 C 120 - C 120 - GT 33 C 120 CC 102 561 
  No Coal until 2004 1954136 2161 - - GT 33 GT 33 GT 33 C 120 - C 120 - C 120 CC 102 561 
  No Coal Option 1980177 28202 - - GT 33 GT 33 CC 102 - GT 33 CC 102 GT 33 CC 102 CC 102 540 
Base Load  No GT in 2001 (See Note 2) 1950606 -1369 - - - C 120 GT 33 GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 CC 102 561 
Forecast  FOR=5% for Candidates 1933808 -18167 - - GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 C 120 579 
  Tax on Diesel Oil (40%) 1958738 6763 - - GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 C 120 579 
  $26M Coal Infrastr. Added 1979224 27249 - - GT 33 GT 33 CC 102 - GT 33 CC 102 GT 33 CC 102 CC 102 540 
  10% Increase of Coal Prices 1965224 13249 - - GT 33 GT 33 C 120 - GT 33 C 120 - C 120 CC 102 561 
     
     
     
Low Load  Coal Available in 2002 1614748 0 - - - - GT 33 - C 120 - - 2xGT 33 C 120 339 
Forecast     
     
     
     
High Load  Coal Available in 2002 2341963 0 - - 2xGT 33 C 120 C 120 C 120 2xGT 33 C 120 CC 102 C120,GT 867 
Forecast     
 
Expansion candidates: C 120 Pulverized coal (120 MW) 
   CC 102 Combined cycle (102 MW) 
   GT 33 Combustion turbine (33 MW) 
 
Other candidates (not selected into the expansion plan until 2009) included: oil-fired steam turbine (63 MW), pulverized coal (80 MW), medium-speed diesel (20 MW),  
low-speed diesel (30 MW), one storage-type hydro project (Back Rio Grande 50.5 MW), and seven small run-of-river hydro projects (less than 10 MW). 
 
Notes: (1) Cost of Plan = Present worth (in U.S. dollars as of 1997) of the total operating and investment costs over the study period 1997-2017. 
 (2) For the scenario “No GT in 2001” the reliability constraints in 2001 were relaxed to enable a feasible solution. 
 9
 
• In the January 1999 report the planning period was defined from 1999 to 2009. The least-cost 
expansion plan obtained for the base case analysis calls for the commissioning of 33 MW 
combustion turbines in 2001, 2004, and 2007, 120 MW pulverized coal units in 2002, 2005, 
and 2008, and a 102 MW combined cycle unit in 2009. Both the combustion turbine and 
combined cycle units were assumed to be using automotive diesel oil (ADO) fuel. In 
addition, for the base case analysis it was assumed that the 120 MW coal-fired unit would be 
available for commissioning in 2002. 
 
• There are certain reservations with regard to the availability of a coal-fired unit in 2002. 
Based on the experience of many utilities around the world, the average construction lead 
time for coal-fired generating units is usually 3-5 years. In the case of Jamaica, the 
construction of a coal-fired unit would also represent an introduction of a new generating 
technology into the system. As coal has to be imported, this would also require a construction 
of appropriate coal handling facilities. In addition, there is a need for plant site preparation, 
which may take from 6 months to 1 year. These are the main reasons why two sensitivity 
studies were carried out to investigate what would be the least-cost expansion plan if the 
coal-fired candidate unit was not available for commissioning in 2002 but in 2003 and in the 
other case in 2004. In both cases, the coal-fired generating unit remained a part of the least-
cost solution and was selected into the expansion plan in the first year in which it was 
assumed to be available, in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The need for new generating 
capacity in the years before the coal-fired unit becomes available for service was satisfied by 
adding 33 MW combustion turbines. The delay of coal-fired unit until 2003 caused an 
increase in the present value of the total system expansion cost of U.S.$ 457,000 compared to 
the base case analysis. A delay of the coal-fired unit until 2004 caused a more significant cost 
increase of U.S.$ 2.161 million. 
 
• The least-cost optimization of system development was also performed for a scenario 
assuming that there will be no construction of coal-fired generating units. This was the so-
called “no coal option.” The least-cost solution obtained for this scenario calls for the 
commissioning of 33 MW combustion turbines in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2007, and for 
102 MW combined cycle units in 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2009. The total capacity of new 
additions in the period 2001-2009 is 540 MW, which is lower than the addition of 561 MW 
in the base case analysis. However, the total system expansion cost (1997-2017) for this 
scenario is U.S.$ 28.2 million higher than in the base case analysis. 
 
• Another sensitivity analysis was performed to determine the effects if no combustion turbine 
will be commissioned in 2001. For this case, the LOLP constraint had to be relaxed in 2001 
in order to allow the optimization program to reach a feasible solution. The LOLP in 2001 
for this case amounted to 0.912% which is higher than the LOLP goal of 0.55% (2 days per 
year) adopted by JPSCo. For reference, in the base case analysis, the LOLP in 2001 amounts 
to 0.275% because of the addition of a 33 MW combustion turbine. Overall, the total cost of 
this expansion scenario is about U.S.$ 1.369 million lower than that of the base case 
expansion plan. The combustion turbine that was in this scenario blocked from 
commissioning in 2001 was selected by the optimization program in 2003. Also, the energy-
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not-served costs in 2001 were higher than in the base case analysis and this partially offset 
the savings made by postponing the construction of the combustion turbine by 2 years. 
 
• To determine the influence of forced outage rates of generating units on the least-cost 
expansion plan, a sensitivity analysis was conducted in which forced outage rates of all 
candidate units were set at 5%.  The optimization results showed that coal-fired candidate 
units were slightly more preferable for system expansion than in the base case analysis in 
which their forced outage rate was specified as 8%. The changes in the expansion schedule 
were minimal and mostly in the later part of the study period. Compared to the base case, the 
first change in the expansion schedule occurred in 2009 when a 102 MW combined cycle 
unit replaced a 120 MW coal-fired unit. Compared to the base case analysis, the cost 
reduction of U.S.$18.167 million over the study period 1997-2017 demonstrates the 
importance of lower forced outage rates for candidate generating units. 
 
• The new base case analysis was conducted as an economic comparison of different system 
development options without local taxes and duties imposed on any of the energy sources. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed with the 40% tax imposed on the diesel oil. The results 
showed that combustion turbines because of their relatively low capacity factor were not 
affected by this tax as much as the combined cycle units. The combustion turbine units 
remained in the least-cost expansion schedule that was obtained for this scenario, while the 
coal-fired generating units replaced most of the combined cycle units.  
 
• A number of sensitivity studies were carried out to examine possible effects of an increase in 
capital investment costs of the 120 MW coal-fired candidate units. For an increase of net 
overnight costs between 1% and 3%, there was no change in the least-cost expansion 
schedule and the first coal-fired unit was selected for service in 2002. For a cost increase 
from 4% to 8%, the coal-fired unit was pushed back by one year and selected for service in 
2003. An increase in capital costs of 9% or higher pushed the commissioning of the first 
coal-fired unit into 2006 and later. The sensitivity study presented in Table 3 shows the 
results obtained for the scenario that assumed that additional infrastructure costs for coal 
handling facilities were added to the capital costs of the first generating unit. In this case, the 
coal-fired generating unit was not selected into the least-cost expansion plan during the 
planning period until 2009. 
 
• Sensitivity studies were also performed to determine possible effects of the increase in coal 
prices. In these studies the coal prices were increased by a certain percentage in the base year 
while retaining the same escalation factors as in the base case over the study period. For an 
increase in coal prices between 1% and 5%, there was no change in the least-cost schedule 
and the first 120 MW coal-fired unit was selected in 2002. For a coal price increase between 
6% and 15%, the coal-fired unit was pushed back by one year and selected for service in 
2003. The optimization results for the sensitivity analysis that are presented in Table 3 are for 
the case assuming a 10% increase in coal prices.  
 
• The optimization of electric system development was also performed for the low and high 
load forecasts. In the case of low load forecast, the least-cost expansion plan consisted of a 
33 MW combustion turbine in 2003, followed by a 120 MW coal-fired unit in 2005. For the 
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3  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• Based on the results of system simulation and optimization of system development there will 
be a need for additional generating capacity in 2001 if the reliability goal for system 
operation (LOLP of 0.55% or 2 days per year) is to be maintained. This capacity would be in 
addition to the existing JPSCo program for restoring and increasing the capacity of existing 
generating units (estimated capacity increase in 2001 is about 20 MW) which is already taken 
into account in the base case analysis. This issue was extensively discussed with JPSCo 
experts who indicated that two additional possibilities exist for achieving an increase in 
system reliability in 2001. One is a comprehensive preventive maintenance program that 
would bring the overall availability of the generating system to above 90% (this program 
started in 1998 and has already achieved some encouraging results), and the other by 
restoring the capacity from two existing gas turbines that are currently not in use. Argonne 
experts agree that both activities would contribute to the increased reliability of system 
operation. However, additional studies should be carried out to determine if these actions 
would be sufficient to achieve the desired reliability level of system operation in 2001. 
 
• The 120 MW coal-fired generating unit appears in the least-cost solution for the base case 
analysis and most sensitivity studies. Two sensitivity studies dealt with Argonne concerns 
regarding the earliest possible startup date for this technology. In these studies the first 
available year for the introduction of coal-fired generating units was delayed from 2002 until 
2003 and 2004, respectively. In both cases the 120 MW coal-fired unit was selected into the 
least-cost solution in the first year in which it was considered available. The commissioning 
of additional 33 MW combustion turbines satisfied capacity needs in the years before the 
introduction of coal-fired units.  
 
• The issue of possible slippage in the implementation schedule also needs to be addressed. 
Slip results from both poor schedule estimating and uncertainties in project implementation. 
The World Bank conducted an analysis of schedule performance by examining a total of 61 
thermal power projects approved for financing in developing countries between 1965 and 
1986. The main causes of slippage in project implementation schedule were grouped into 
three categories by attribution of responsibility: (1) project client and engineers, 
(2) contractors and suppliers, and (3) uncontrollable events. The study found that the relative 
frequency of causes in these three categories were as follows: client/engineer – 34%, 
contractor/supplier - 50%, and uncontrollable events - 16%. A wide range of causes were 
cited, and they are listed in Annex 1. The relative importance of the causes were identified by 
counting the number of times that each cause was cited in project completion reports. 
 
• The other concern regarding the introduction of 120 MW coal fired unit is connected with its 
performance in the relatively small generating system of Jamaica and its possible impact on 
the reliability of system operation. This issue has also been discussed extensively with JPSCo 
 12
experts who were rather confident that the introduction of a large unit of this size would not 
adversely affect the operation of the system. The discussion covered the issues of “must run” 
capacities and minimum system load, maintenance scheduling, forced outages, stability of 
the transmission network, etc. JPSCo experts pointed out that they have in place an under-
frequency load shedding plan that comes into effect in case of large forced outages. 
According to JPSCo experts, in one instance the system has survived a simultaneous outage 
of two 68 MW generating units. Argonne’s recommendation to JPSCo is to perform 
additional analyses of system operation with the 120 MW coal-fired units using a detailed 
production cost model, as well as to perform load flow and stability analyses of the 
transmission network. 
 
• The siting and environmental studies for the potential location of the coal-fired power plant 
should be accelerated and completed as soon as possible. One of the important considerations 
should be to choose a site that is capable of accommodating multiple generating units. 
 
• The environmental issues concerning the coal-fired technology for electricity generation 
should be discussed publicly. There are numerous “clean coal technologies” and 
environmental control technologies presently available that are capable of significantly 
reducing the emissions from coal-fired power plants. For example, electrostatic precipitators 
are capable of reducing 99.5% of particulate emissions, while flue gas desulfurization 
equipment can reduce SO2 emissions by more than 95%. The general public in Jamaica 
should be informed in an easy to understand manner what control technologies would be 
installed at the coal-fired power plant and what their efficiency would be in pollution 
mitigation. This is especially important because of the possible repercussions on the tourist 
industry. 
 
• The levelized electricity production cost from the 120 MW coal-fired generating units is 
lower than that of the oil- and diesel-fired candidates. The sensitivity studies on coal prices 
showed that coal-fired generating units would remain competitive in case of coal price 
increases up to 15%. 
 
• The results of the sensitivity studies showed that the 120 MW coal-fired candidate units are 
rather sensitive to an increase in capital investment costs. The base case analysis assumed for 
the 120 MW coal-fired generating unit a net overnight cost of U.S.$ 1,300 per kW of 
capacity, which was increased by 15% to U.S.$ 1,495 per kW to account for the 
environmental control equipment. Sensitivity studies showed that a 4% increase in capital 
costs would delay the coal-fired generating unit by one year to 2003, while a 9% increase 
would postpone its commissioning until 2006.  
 
• The 102 MW combined cycle and 63 MW oil-fired steam candidate units were less desirable 
for baseload duty than the 120 MW coal-fired units mostly because of the higher fuel costs. 
The heavy fuel oil for oil-fired candidate units was about 45% more expensive than the coal 
in the base year, while the combined cycle units were modeled as running on expensive 
automotive diesel oil. The other coal-fired candidate unit (80 MW) was less competitive than 
the 120 MW unit size because of lower efficiency and higher specific investment costs. 
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• The possible use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a fuel for the combined cycle candidate 
units was discussed in the January 1999 report. The authors correctly concluded that the price 
of the LNG fuel in combination with the high infrastructure cost for the construction of an 
LNG terminal does not make LNG-fired combined cycle units very competitive in the near 
term. This is especially true considering the potential capacity need of the electric sector for 
just a few relatively small combined cycle units during the planning period until 2009. 
However, the construction of an LNG terminal may be justified if the needs of the whole 
energy sector in Jamaica are considered, especially in the long term. In this case, the LNG-
based combined cycle units could also become more competitive for the expansion of the 
electric sector if a part of the infrastructure costs for the LNG terminal are spread over other 
industrial users. This issue needs to be carefully studied in context of developing a national 
energy strategy for Jamaica. 
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ANNEX 1 
 
 
Factors Responsible for Schedule Slip in Thermal Power Projects 
 
 
Client/Engineer 
 
- legal requirements/bureaucratic procedure for awarding contracts 
- initial schedule was too optimistic 
- bid evaluation difficulties 
- delays in procurement/placement of orders 
- change in project scope 
- modifications to major equipment required 
- disagreement between Bank and borrower over contract award 
- site change 
 
 
Contractor/Supplier 
 
- labor disputes/strikes in manufacturer’s country 
- labor disputes/strikes in project country 
- shipping delays 
- substandard work had to be redone 
- equipment failure during testing 
- skilled labor shortage 
- manufacturing difficulties 
- shortage of materials 
- contractor inefficiency/lack of coordination 
- technical problems with equipment 
- contractor bankruptcy 
- transportation difficulties 
 
 
Uncontrollable Events 
 
- damage/need to redesign civil works due to earthquake or other natural disaster 
- unusually bad weather 
- accident – damage to equipment 
- political turmoil/coup/invasion 
- civil disturbance 
